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Abstract 
This paper investigates the economic consequences of sickness and death and 
the manner in which poor urban households in Bangladesh respond to such 
events. Based on longitudinal data we assess the effects of morbidity and 
mortality episodes on household income, medical spending, labour supply and 
consumption. We find that despite maintaining household labour supply, a 
serious illness exerts a negative effect on household income for the poor. 
However, the estimates do not reject consumption smoothing. The most 
prominent response to finance current needs is to borrow from money lenders, 
which leads to an increase in household debt-to-income ratios with possible 
detrimental effects on future consumption. 
Keywords 
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I. Introduction  
In recent years, the economic consequences of episodes of morbidity and 
mortality in developing countries have received increasing academic and policy 
attention (for instance, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Asfaw and von Braun 2004, 
McIntyre et al. 2006, Wagstaff 2007, Gertler et al. 2009, Genoni 2012, Sparrow et 
al. 2013). In the absence of health and life insurance, serious illnesses or the 
death of a family member are likely to push vulnerable households who rely 
heavily on their labour, deeper into penury. Households experiencing 
unexpected bouts of illness or the death of a family member are likely to incur 
income losses to the extent that they rely on wage income and at the same time 
be forced to spend a larger fraction of their household budget on health care. To 
cope with such events and maintain consumption, households may liquidate 
assets, resort to intra-household labour substitution, borrow or withdraw 
children from school with potentially deleterious consequences for future 
household welfare.1   
In one of the earliest studies to investigate the economic effects of 
illnesses, Townsend (1994), based on ICRISAT panel data from rural India, 
concluded that after controlling for village-level consumption, an idiosyncratic 
shock such as illness measured by the percentage of the year that an adult male 
was sick, had no effect on household consumption. Using the same data base 
Kochar (1995) found that the illness of a male household member especially 
during the peak period of the agricultural cycle was associated with a decline in 
                                                        
1 On the basis of their review of studies from low and middle-income countries McIntyre et al. 
(2006, p. 860) provide a useful illustration of the economic consequences and potential coping 
mechanisms available to households when faced by health shocks.  Earlier reviews of the 
literature on income risk and coping strategies in developing countries are provided by 
Alderman and Paxson (1994), Townsend (1995), Morduch (1999), and Dercon (2002).  
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wage income and increased informal borrowing.  Taken together, these two 
studies suggest that while households may be able to retain consumption at least 
in the short run, this may come at the risk of future impoverishment. It also 
highlights the importance of jointly analysing the effects of illnesses on income, 
consumption and coping strategies. 
In general, the evidence on household ability to insure consumption 
against ill-health is mixed. In a nuanced analysis that supports a distinction 
between minor and more severe illnesses, Gertler and Gruber (2002) use a large 
panel data set from rural Indonesia to show that while households are able to 
insure consumption against 70 percent of high-frequency minor illnesses, they 
are able to protect themselves against only 30 percent of low-frequency illnesses 
that limit the physical functioning of family members.  Also based on data from 
Indonesia, Gertler et al. (2009) and Nguyen and Mangyo (2010) conclude that 
households are unable to protect their consumption against large health shocks 
and chronic illnesses. In contrast, Genoni (2012) finds no evidence of imperfect 
consumption smoothing in Indonesia while Sparrow et al. (2013) report that it is 
only informal sector workers and the poor who are unable to protect their 
consumption. Studies for other countries that show that households are only 
partly able to smooth consumption, especially in the event of large infrequent 
shocks and chronic illness, include Dercon and Krishnan (2000) and Asfaw and 
Braun (2004) for Ethiopia, and Wagstaff (2007) for Vietnam, whereas Mohanan 
(2013) finds little evidence of imperfect smoothing in India and De Weerdt and 
Dercon (2006) find evidence of consumption smoothing through networks in 
Tanzania. Pertinent to the current context, based on panel data from rural 
Bangladesh, Skoufias and Quisumbing (2005) find no effect of male or female 
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illnesses on household consumption. While, in a more recent paper, also based 
on panel data from rural Bangladesh, Islam and Maitra (2012) report that 
consumption smoothing is imperfect in the case of a large shock. 
While there are several reasons for the differences in the degree of 
consumption smoothing reported across papers, of primary concern in the 
relatively recent papers in this genre (Wagstaff 2007; Genoni 2012, Mohanan 
2013, Sparrow et al. 2013) are the transmission channels through which ill-
health and mortality affect consumption and identification of the strategies 
adopted by households to maintain consumption.  Indeed, the effects of mortality 
and morbidity on current consumption and the ability of households to 
(partially) maintain consumption may be a misleading indicator of the economic 
impacts of such events, especially if consumption is maintained through 
incurring high-cost debt (e.g. Mohanan 2013), selling assets (e.g. Islam and 
Maitra 2012) or foregoing human capital investments in children. Echoing this 
view, Chetty and Looney (2006) argue that focusing on the effect of a shock on 
consumption is not very informative without determining why and how 
households smooth consumption. 
This paper uses data from urban Bangladesh to add to the relatively thin 
literature which explores the transmission channels, coping responses and 
economic consequences of mortality and morbidity episodes.2 The paper relies 
on longitudinal data and examines the effect of serious illnesses and the recent 
death of a household member on medical expenditure, income, labour supply 
                                                        
2 In the Bangladeshi context, a number of papers (Carrin et al. 1998, Kabir et al. 2000, Begum and 
Sen 2004) have examined the effects of illnesses on the livelihoods of rickshaw pullers and more 
generally the urban poor. These studies suggest that ill-health is the single most important factor 
influencing the (downward) economic mobility of households. While these papers yield useful 
insights they do not use longitudinal data or rely on econometric analysis making it difficult to 
isolate the effects of health shocks as compared to other factors. 
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and consumption. An assessment of the effect of health shocks on these various 
outcomes, as opposed to focusing only on the overall effect on consumption, is 
likely to provide insights on the channels through which health shocks affect 
households. We also study the strategies adopted by households to deal with 
shocks and subsequently investigate the effect of the most commonly used 
coping strategy on future consumption. An additional novelty is the focus on 
urban households as compared to the bulk of the literature which deals with 
such issues in a rural context.3  As argued by Wagstaff (2007) in the case of 
Vietnam and by Begum and Sen (2004) and BBS-UNICEF (2010) in the 
Bangladeshi context, given their occupational choices and the concentration of 
various government and NGO human development programmes in rural areas, 
the urban poor have lower access to basic services and might be more vulnerable 
to health shocks as compared to their rural counterparts.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section II outlines the setting and the 
data while section III lays out the empirical framework. Section IV discusses the 
results while section V summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
II. The setting, data and descriptive analysis  
II.1 The setting 
                                                        
3 An exception is Wagstaff (2007) who analyses the effects of morbidity, mortality and changes in 
health status as measured by the body mass index (BMI) on income, medical expenditure and 
consumption in urban Vietnam.  He finds that earned income is negatively affected by health 
shocks, especially the death of a working-age household member, with larger proportionate 
effects in urban areas. The effect of other health shocks on income is not as pronounced. While 
effects on labour supply are not directly analysed, Wagstaff argues that given their smaller size 
and less flexible working arrangements, urban households are more vulnerable to health shocks 
as they are unable to adjust labour supply as readily as their rural counterparts.  
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According to the latest available figures, Bangladesh is one of the most densely 
populated countries in the world (1111 individuals per square kilometre) with 
27 percent of its 160 million population living in urban areas. Driven by the rapid 
inflow of rural migrants due to poverty and environmental reasons, urban 
population growth (3.5 percent per annum between 2005-2010) far outstrips 
the corresponding figure for rural areas (1 percent), contributing to the growth 
of slums. An estimated 60 percent of the urban population lives in slums.4 At a 
national level, health facilities are limited with 0.6 hospital beds and 0.4 
registered physicians per thousand persons in 2011which is substantially lower 
than other developing countries.5 Insurance coverage is almost non-existent and 
in 2011, out-of- pocket payments accounted for about 96.6 percent of private 
health expenditure.6 
 This study is set in the slums of Dinajpur, a city of about 270,000 
residents located in the north-western region of Bangladesh, about 400 
kilometres from Dhaka. The town consists of 80 communities of which 59 are 
classified as slum communities. The slum communities are integrated into the 
city and slum-dwellers are typically engaged in the informal sector and in 
occupations such as trading and hawking, domestic work, rickshaw pulling, brick 
breaking and construction. In terms of government health facilities, the town has 
a 500 bed public general hospital. In addition, there are a large number of 
pharmacies, private clinics and diagnostic centres as well as a range of religious 
and spiritual healers.  
                                                        
4 All figures in the preceding sentences are from http://data.un.org (accessed on June 11, 2011). 
5 For instance, corresponding figures for India in 2003 were 1 bed and 0.58 physicians per 
thousand persons. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (accessed December 19, 2013).  
6 In 2011 public health expenditure amounted to 36.6 percent of total health expenditure while 
total health expenditure was 3.7 percent of GDP. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
(accessed December 19, 2013). 
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II.2 Data 
This study relies on data from the SHAHAR (Supporting Household Activities for 
Health, Assets, and Revenue) Dinajpur Survey which was conducted in slums and 
low-income settlements within the municipal areas of Dinajpur in 2002-2003 by 
CARE-Bangladesh and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
Based on observed levels of poverty, social cohesion, community size, and 
environmental hazards, the 59 slum communities in Dinajpur were assigned a 
vulnerability score. Of these, fourteen slums with a high vulnerability score were 
selected for an intervention by CARE. Based on power calculations, a simple 
random sample of 614 households was drawn from the selected slums. The 
sample represents about 60 percent of the overall slum population of Dinajpur 
(for details, see Buttenheim 2008).7  
 Three survey rounds were conducted with the first round taking place in 
July-August 2002 followed by round 2 in March 2003 and round 3 in August-
September 2003. In the first round, enumerators successfully contacted and 
interviewed 585 households or 95 percent of the desired sample of 614 
households. In the second round, data were collected from 567 households (92% 
of original sample, 97% of the first round households) and in the final round 553 
households (90% of the original sample, 95% of the first round households).8 
These three survey rounds were combined to create a panel data set. The 
                                                        
7 The sample size for the survey was designed to support the detection of statistically significant 
changes in child stunting. Nutritional status was chosen as the key variable of interest as the 
objective of the program was to improve food and nutrition security (IFPRI 2009). 
8 A sample attrition rate of 5 percent is quite small suggesting that the data are unlikely to be 
afflicted by attrition bias. More formally, based on data from the first round, a probit regression 
with drop-out as the dependent variable indicates that except for household size there is no 
systematic difference in various observed characteristics between households who drop out 
from the sample and those who remain. Most notably there is no evidence that the incidence of 
morbidity or mortality is systematically linked to dropping out from the sample. See Table A1. 
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surveys gathered information on household composition, education, 
employment, savings and credit, household food and non-food consumption, 
assets, and most pertinently for this paper - on various shocks affecting 
households, their financial consequences and household responses to these 
shocks.  
 To complement the quantitative data, in July 2010, qualitative 
information was collected by the first author in six of Dinajpur’s slum 
communities. The aim was to explore and understand household 
conceptualization of health shocks and the manner in which households deal 
with such events. Data gathering approaches included semi-structured 
interviews with 11 households (selected based on variation in terms of age, 
occupation, and gender) who had experienced a recent morbidity or mortality 
event, three focus group discussions of five to seven individuals and interviews 
with five key informants.9  
 
II.3 Descriptive analysis – shocks and coping  
The survey solicited information on 26 different types of shocks that may affect 
households. Across the three survey rounds, about 32 percent of the total 
household-observations indicate the presence of a shock. While households face 
an array of shocks, by far the most common (49 percent) is a serious illness - an 
illness which prevents a household member from undertaking normal activities - 
in the last one year (Table 1). The death of a household member accounted for 
                                                        
9 The five informants were a traditional healer, an NGO official, hospital nurse, health worker and 
community leader. 
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about 8 percent of the shocks.10 Specifically with regard to sickness and death, 
168 households report a health shock in round 1, while in rounds 2 and 3, the 
number of households reporting such events appears to decline sharply to 58 
and 82 households (see Table 2). However, this is misleading. Since rounds 2 and 
3 were conducted six months after the preceding surveys, in practice the 
responses to the mortality and morbidity questions in rounds 2 and 3 cover the 
six month period preceding the previous survey rather than the longer recall 
periods used for the first round. Overall, over a three year period, 308 
households or about 55 percent of sampled households had to deal with 
mortality or serious morbidity. While the incidence of mortality/morbidity 
seems high, given the nature of the sample – urban slum dwellers and their often 
physically demanding occupations – this is probably not surprising.  In their 
work on rickshaw pullers in Dhaka, Begum and Sen (2004) report a morbidity 
rate of 11.4 percent on the day of the survey and 39 percent over a period of one 
month.11 Similarly, Kabir et al. (2000) in their analysis of slum dwellers in Dhaka 
find that 40 percent of sampled individuals reported some kind of illness in the 
past 14 days. 
 The survey then follows on by inquiring about the most important 
manner in which households react to the costs associated with morbidity and 
mortality. At 39 percent, the most prominent response is “none” (see Table 3). 
Since the measure of morbidity is any illness that prevents an individual from 
engaging in normal activities and is not sensitive to the duration of the event, no-
                                                        
10 In the survey context, a household is defined as a group of people who live together and take 
food from the “same pot”. A household member is defined as an individual who has lived in the 
household for at least 12 months and at least half of the week in each week during the 12 month 
period. 
11 According to Begum and Sen (2004) both these rates are higher than those for the rural poor. 
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response may reflect illnesses of short duration which did not have particularly 
onerous financial implications. In terms of a more active response, the most 
common approach is to resort to borrowing from a money lender (about 31 
percent) followed by depleting assets or savings (8.4 percent), borrowing from 
NGOs (6.8 percent) and taking help from their social network (5.8 percent). 12 
The semi-structured interviews confirmed this pattern, with the respondents 
pointing out that while borrowing from money lenders at annual average 
interest rates ranging from 30 to 200 percent is not a preferred option, it is the 
most widely used response. The use of this potentially harmful coping option 
highlights the limited access to formal sources of credit and restricted social 
network, at least with regard to finance, of slum dwellers.  
 Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of some of the key 
variables. The sampled households are relatively poor compared to national 
patterns. In the first survey round 60 percent of the households reported total 
expenditure that, per capita, falls below the 2000 urban poverty line.13 To place 
this in a national perspective, Sen (2003) estimates an urban (rural) poverty 
headcount of 26 (44) percent in 2000.14 A typical sample household is headed by 
a 43 year old male (87 percent) and has 4 to 5 members. Educational attainment 
is low with only about 16 percent of the heads having completed at least primary 
                                                        
12 Although they do not provide any figures, Kabir et al. (2000) also mention that taking a loan is 
the most common response to cope with illness-induced costs amongst slum dwellers in Dhaka. 
They argue that savings are limited and do not provide adequate support in case of a serious 
illness and sale of productive assets, if available, is rare. 
13 Based on the 2000 urban poverty line of 724.6 Bangladeshi Taka per person/month, calculated 
by Sen (2003) following the cost of basic needs method. This is equivalent to US$12.18 on August 
1, 2002. If we take a poverty line of US$1 per day, then about 92 percent of the households in 
round 1 would classify as poor. 
14 The World Development Indicators estimate the urban and rural poverty headcount in 2000 at 
35 and 52 percent, respectively. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
(accessed on December 6, 2013). 
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school. On average a household supplies 80-100 hours of labour per week or 
about 21 hours per capita. Depending on the survey round, unearned income 
contributes to between 6 to 11 percent of per capita total monthly income. The 
main sources of this unearned income are transfers, social assistance, leasing 
property or selling assets. Health expenditure accounts for 5 to 6 percent of total 
household spending.  The bulk of household income is spent on food which 
accounts for between 50-56 percent of total non-medical spending. In the first 
round, loans amount to 54 percent of per capita annual income while in rounds 2 
and 3, the debt-burden appears to have increased with loans amounting to 72-80 
percent of per capita annual income.  The unsustainability of borrowing from 
money lenders and the consequences of such a strategy were clearly amplified 
during field work.  For instance, one of the key informants, a male 40 year old 
male community leader, reported that at times households flee in order to 
escape harassment from money lenders. Additionally, in one of the eleven case 
studies, a 45 year old male respondent stated: 
“…after repaying monthly interest instalment I cannot afford my family. I have 
sent my daughter to her grandparent’s house to reduce food and education 
expenses. It is giving us so much pain and worries like a slow poisoning. I do not 
see any hope escaping from this vicious trap in near future. Sometimes I wish we 
head down together to the railway.” [Interview conducted on July 23, 2010]. 
 
In a number of the 11 case studies, while households mentioned that they 
were able to borrow to meet their immediate needs, this was followed by 
withdrawal of children from school and their induction into the labour force. For 
instance a 32 year female respondent narrated that her mother-in-law had been 
suffering from severe illnesses for one and a half years, which had led to a huge 
debt burden due to treatment costs. After meeting consumption expenses and 
repaying the monthly loan instalment, the earnings from her husband’s rickshaw 
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pulling are insufficient to pay for the medical expenses and education expenses 
for her son. Consequently, her nine year old son began working as a shop 
assistant.  Similarly, the son of a 45 year old female respondent narrated,  
“I cannot go to school regularly after my mother’s illness, because I have to cook 
and take care of her. Currently, I am working in a nearby mosque to clean and 
carry orders of Imam (religious leader) of the mosque where my father used to 
work.” [Interview conducted on July 24, 2010]. 
 
III. Methods  
Our empirical analysis assesses (i) the channels of economic risk of morbidity 
and mortality for households, (ii) the ability to smooth consumption when faced 
with these risks, (iii) the role of coping strategies for smoothing consumption, 
and (iv) the dynamic effects of using borrowing as a coping response. 
We therefore test whether morbidity and mortality have a causal effect on 
per capita household income (earned and unearned) and OOP (Out-of-pocket) 
health spending in the last month, per capita household food and non-food 
consumption net of medical spending, and the self-reported coping strategies for 
dealing with a health related shock. These coping strategies are grouped into 
depleting assets and savings, borrowing and other strategies. In addition, we 
consider adjusting labour supply (per capita hours worked by household 
members the in past seven days) as a coping response and the debt-to-income 
ratio (total outstanding debt at the time of the interview as a ratio of income in 
the last month) as measure of severity of indebtedness. Finally, to test for 
dynamic effects of incurring debt, we estimate the effect of a change in the one-
period lagged debt-to-income ratio on per capita household consumption. 
The consumption, income and OOP related outcome variables have a 
typically skewed and non-normal distribution censored at zero, which makes 
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linear models such as ordinary least squares unsuitable. We therefore use a fixed 
effects Poisson model (FEP) in order to deal with these distributions and also 
avoid retransformation problems of taking natural logs of the outcome variables 
(Manning and Mullahy 2001, Buntin and Zaslavsky 2004, Mihaylova et al. 2011, 
Sparrow et al. 2013).15 An advantage of using a FEP model is that the outcome 
variable does not actually need to follow a Poisson distribution; the FEP 
estimator is consistent under the assumption that the conditional mean is 
correctly specified (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, Wooldridge 2002). For the 
outcome variables per capita household income and expenditure we specify the 
conditional mean as: 
 
| , 	, 
 ,   exp
   	′  
    (1) 
 
The vector of the main ill health variables of interest () includes 
morbidity and mortality indicators for household i in survey wave t. Morbidity is 
defined as serious illness or injury of a household member, as it is reported in 
Table 1, while the mortality variable combines death of a main earners and that 
of any other household member. The β coefficients can be interpreted as a 
percentage change in y due to a unit change in the morbidity and mortality 
indicators. We further include time-community interacted fixed effects (
) to 
capture covariate trends in income and expenditure, and household fixed effects 
(). The association between self-reported ill health and the outcome variables 
could be misleading as a causal effect if there are unobserved characteristics 
                                                        
15 We also estimate linear fixed effects models, which give qualitatively similar results. These 
results are reported in a supplemental appendix. 
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driving the relationship. For example, an individual’s perception of one’s health 
status will affect self-reporting of illness but might itself be affected by socio-
economic factors. The households fixed effects control for such unobserved 
confounders since these are typically time invariant. In addition, a vector of 
household characteristics (	) controls for important time variant 
characteristics, such as household size, the demographic profile and a set of non-
health related yet potentially confounding self-reported shocks (loss of crops and 
livestock, loss of assets, bankruptcy and other shocks). 
A number of the outcome variables are binary, in which case we use a 
linear probability model with household fixed effects. These variables include 
the self-reported coping strategies (depleting assets and savings, borrowing, 
other), as well as incidence of catastrophic OOP health care spending (indicating 
whether household spent more than 15percent of their budget on health care). 
The linear probability models include the same control variables and time-
community interaction terms as the FEP models. 
The questions for coping strategies depleting assets and savings, 
borrowing and other strategies are asked contingent on the respondent 
reporting a shock. For these variables we therefore restrict the sample to those 
households that reported any shock in the respective survey round, yielding an 
unbalanced panel.  
Two empirical problems remain that are not explicitly addressed by the 
fixed effects strategy. First, the fixed effects estimates will be biased if the 
vulnerability to morbidity and mortality is directly affected by a change in 
consumption. However, such a relationship is typically a long run phenomena 
and unlikely to be observed over the relatively short intervals of the Dinajpur 
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survey waves. Moreover, this bias would cause the coefficients to overestimate 
the effects of morbidity and mortality and increase the probability that the null 
hypothesis of consumption smoothing will be rejected. As the next section will 
show, we do not observe this in the estimation results. A second potential 
problem is state dependence, which occurs when preferences are affected by 
changes in health status. In this case any observed correlation between 
morbidity and consumption could be due to shifting preference rather than the 
economic impacts of morbidity. Unfortunately we were not able to test for state 
dependence. However, other studies of ill health events that are able to test do 
not find evidence of state dependence (see, for example, Gertler and Gruber 2002, 
Gertler et al. 2009, Sparrow et al. 2013).16 
 
IV. Results 
The effects of morbidity and mortality of a household member on the channels of 
economic risk – medical spending and income loss – are shown in Table 5. 
Serious illness increases per capita OOP health spending by 96 percent and OOP 
as a share of the household budget by 66 percent. This increase in average 
medical spending also includes some potentially impoverishing health spending 
events, as the incidence of catastrophic health spending increases by 13 
percentage points. As expected, the death of a household member does not affect 
                                                        
16 We follow a test proposed by Gertler and Gruber (2002) and Gertler et al. (2009). 
Unfortunately the test was inconclusive as to whether state dependence is an issue for our 
analysis. The intuition behind this test is that if state dependence occurs, we expected it to affect 
the correlation between morbidity and consumption irrespective of whether a household is 
budget constrained in smoothing away morbidity events. This implies a test for state 
dependence, by comparing different subsamples with varying (expected) ability to self-insure. 
For our sample we looked at the poorest and wealthiest 50 percent of households in the sample. 
We rank households based on two separate measures: (i) per capita household (non-medical) 
expenditures in wave 1 of the survey, and (ii) the monetary value of asset holdings in wave 1. 
However, for both wealth measures we cannot reject the consumption smoothing for any of the 
subsamples, which renders the test ineffective. 
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OOP medical spending. We see a reverse pattern for income loss. On average, 
income is not affected by illness, while a recent death of a household member 
does reduce per capita earned income by about 30 percent. 
Serious illness increases OOP health spending irrespective of the level of 
wealth, and these effects are similar in magnitude to the average effects for the 
full sample (Table 6). The effects on health spending and catastrophic spending 
incidence are slightly larger for the wealthiest half of the sample, but the 
differences between the groups are not statistically significant.  
However, we do see considerable differences for the poorest and 
wealthiest halves of the sample with regard to income loss. For households 
among the poorest 50 percent, serious illness leads to a loss of monthly earned 
income of 11 percent. A death of a household member is associated with a 
negative coefficient for earned income, translating to an 11 percent reduction, 
although this estimate is not precise. In contrast, unearned income for this group 
increases by 133 percent as a result of the death of a household member, 
possibly due to sales of assets or receiving remittances and informal transfers 
through social networks. There is some evidence of this from the qualitative 
interviews, which also feature anecdotes of local communities and family 
members collecting donations from local markets, a nearby railway station and 
bus stops, and local mosques for funeral assistance. For instance, a neighbour of 
a 12 year old girl who lives with her two younger brothers and who had lost her 
mother a month before the interview stated,  
“Her father is physically disabled. He begs on the street and sleeps on railway 
platform. Her mother was the only earning member in the house. At the time of 
her death, she left almost nothing - no money; no foods - except a small shanty. We 
collected some donation for her funerals and gave it to her (the girl) for their 
livelihoods.’’[Interview conducted on July 23, 2010]. 
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For the wealthiest half of the sample we see that a death in the household 
reduces earned income by 41 percent and total income by 40 percent, but we 
find no effects of serious illness on income. Many of the households in this 
subsample are involved in small trading, such as street peddlers with a fixed 
location and petty trade. These mostly informal trade practices operate with the 
help of household members, which may also provide income protection in case 
of serious illness of other household member. A small fraction of households also 
rely on income from formal sector employment, such as low-grade employees 
with government and semi-government organisations, which provide some 
income protection. 
We find that households manage to smooth their food and non-food 
consumption when faced with serious illness and the associated increase in OOP 
medical spending (Table 5), irrespective of wealth level (Table 6). Consumption 
levels for the poor are not affected by the lost earned income when a productive 
household member dies, most likely due to the offsetting effects of (informal) 
transfers (Table 6).  Interestingly, we see that the death of a household member 
actually increases per capita non-food consumption for the wealthiest half of the 
sample, presumably because household non-food consumption is not easily 
reduced in the short term, while the number of household members is reduced. 
Borrowing and drawing on assets and savings are key coping strategies 
for the poorest in dealing with the economic risk of ill health (Table 7). Incidence 
of serious illness among poor households increases the probability of borrowing 
by 76 percentage point and the debt-to-income by 62 percent. The death of a 
family member increases both the probability of borrowing, by 54 percentage 
points, and depleting assets and savings, by 38 percentage points. However, 
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there is no discernible increase in the debt-to-income ratio. For the wealthiest 
half, we find no clear evidence of borrowing or depleting assets and savings as 
coping strategy. There is a negative effect of mortality on labour supply, which 
can be explained by the loss of an economically active household member. 
While borrowing may seem a successful coping strategy for the poor to 
smooth consumption, there may be long term implications of incurring debt.  We 
find indirect evidence suggesting that these long term effects of health related 
borrowing are indeed relevant. Table 8 shows estimates of the effects of a change 
in the debt-to-income ratio on future consumption. Per capita non-food and total 
consumption decrease by about 1 percent if total outstanding debt 6 months 
earlier increases by an amount equal to monthly per capita income. The 
coefficients for the subsamples are of similar size and signs, but not statistically 
significant.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the economic consequences of morbidity and mortality 
for the poor in urban slums of Bangladesh, the manner in which these 
households respond to such events, and how their most common coping strategy 
– borrowing – affects future consumption. 
Both medical spending and income loss are substantial sources of 
economic risk from illness. We find that a serious illness of a household member 
sharply increases OOP health spending and the incidence of catastrophic 
spending. Moreover, a serious illness exerts a negative effect on household 
income for the poorest half of the sample. A death among economically active 
household members also leads to income loss, by reducing labour supply. 
 18 
 
Nevertheless, our results do not reject consumption smoothing; at least 
not in the short term.  The most prominent response to finance current needs is 
to borrow from money lenders, which leads to an increase in household debt-to-
income ratios with detrimental effects on future consumption.  
Public health policy in Bangladesh over the last decade has focussed 
mainly on improving nutritional status, child malnutrition, maternity health and 
family-planning services, but has been notably absent on issues regarding health 
care need and affordability for the urban poor (e.g. Osman 2009, Rashid 2009). 
Our findings suggest that policies geared at providing financial protection from 
ill health for urban poor, such as subsidized health coverage or insurance (e.g. 
Hamid et al. 2011) and access to affordable credit (e.g. Islam and Maitra 2012) 
could contribute to reducing impoverishment and the risk of poverty traps for 
the urban poor due to morbidity and mortality. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Household reporting to experience unexpected negative events 
Type of shock (recall period) Survey round Total % 
 1 2 3   
Death of main earner in household a  2 5 3 10 1.8 
Death of other household member a  19 8 4 31 5.7 
Serious injury or illness b 147 45 75 267 48.8 
Loss of a regular job b 7 2 6 15 2.7 
Eviction from previous residence b 44 4 0 48 8.8 
Divorce or abandonment b 9 1 3 13 2.4 
Major loss of crops b 2 1 0 3 0.5 
Loss of livestock b 13 5 9 27 4.9 
Loss of productive assets b 3 4 5 12 2.2 
Loss of consumption assets b 17 1 2 20 3.7 
Dowry payment b 5 3 6 14 2.6 
Failure or bankruptcy of business b 1 9 16 26 4.8 
Extortion by mastans/hoodlums c 5 2 0 7 1.3 
Police confiscated assets c 1 0 4 5 0.9 
Household member arrested c 3 1 5 9 1.6 
Paid a large bribe c 4 4 0 8 1.5 
Long duration hartals/strikes c 5 0 0 5 0.9 
Rickshaw broken by picketers c 2 0 0 2 0.4 
Other 5 2 18 25 4.6 
Total 294 97 156 547 100.0 
Notes: Recall periods in the first year are (a) 2 years, (b) 1 year, and (c) 6 months. In 
the second and third survey rounds the recall period for all variables is the six 
months preceding the surveys. 
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Table 2 Households experiencing morbidity and mortality 
Morbidity and mortality  Survey round Total 
 1 2 3  
Death of a household member 21 13 7 41 
 (3.6) (2.3) (1.3)  
Serious illness of a household member 147 45 75 267 
 (25.1) (7.9) (13.6)  
Total 168 58 82 308 
 (28.7) (10.2) (14.8)  
Number of households 585 567 553 1706 
Notes: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of households. Recall periods 
in the first year are 2 years for a death and 1 year for serious illness of a 
household member. In the second and third survey rounds the recall period for 
both variables is the six months preceding the surveys. 
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Table 3 Main coping response of households affected by morbidity and mortality 
Coping strategy Frequency Percent 
Deplete assets and savings   
Sold/mortgaged productive asset  10 3.2 
Sold/mortgaged consumption asset 8 2.6 
Used savings  8 2.6 
Borrowing   
Took loan from NGOs/institution/employer 22 7.1 
Took loan from mahajan (moneylender) 94 30.5 
Other strategies   
Reduced food consumption 10 3.2 
Sent non-working household member to work 3 1.0 
Took help from others 18 5.8 
Other (non-specified) 14 4.5 
None 121 39.3 
Total 308 100.0 
Notes: Reported frequencies are conditional on households reporting a shock. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Per capita earned income in last month* 735.65 476.37 686.60 493.09 709.99 588.46 
Per capita unearned income in last  month* 54.31 158.39 51.11 221.66 57.47 169.46 
Per capita food consumption in last week* 89.13 64.17 79.92 89.05 99.95 57.39 
Per capita non-food consumption in last week* 85.29 136.64 78.67 130.86 94.54 324.12 
Per capita health expenses in last week* 10.92 33.47 11.22 31.90 13.15 44.31 
Budget share of OOP health expenses 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.10 
Incidence of catastrophic health spending (OOP share>15%) 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 
Per capita hours worked in last week 21.51 13.95 20.34 13.87 20.61 12.80 
Outstanding loans* 5135.02 13274.56 6394.13 22513.61 7437.33 17431.87 
Age of household head 42.48 12.62 43.02 12.39 43.36 12.37 
Male household head 0.86 0.35 0.86 0.34 0.87 0.34 
Household size 4.26 1.77 4.47 1.82 4.61 1.86 
Head completed primary school 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29 
Head completed secondary school 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 
Head completed higher secondary school 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 
Observations 585 567 553 
Notes: (*) Figures are in Bangladeshi Taka (BDT); 1 Euro = 58.18 BDT on August 1, 2002. 
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Table 5 Effects of serious illness and death of household members on per capita household consumption and income 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share CHS 15% Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
Serious illness 0.961 0.660 0.135 -0.040 0.058 -0.034 0.048 0.076 0.056 
 (0.160)** (0.120)** (0.034)** (0.045) (0.200) (0.048) (0.044) (0.090) (0.051) 
Death  -0.286 -0.419 -0.104 -0.301 0.069 -0.288 -0.009 0.867 0.382 
 (0.468) (0.358) (0.070) (0.130)* (0.434) (0.133)* (0.112) (0.281)** (0.175)* 
Observations 1608 1579 1694 1659 1180 1659 1627 1658 1626 
Households 540 534 592 557 396 557 550 557 550 
Model FE Poisson FE Poisson Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and linear fixed effects models. Other covariates that 
are omitted from the table include indicator variables for other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and 
time-community interaction terms. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 6 Effects of serious illness and death of household members on per capita household consumption and income for the poorest and 
wealthiest 50% of the sample 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share CHS 15% Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
Poorest 50%          
Serious 
illness 
0.859 0.703 0.115 -0.106 0.026 -0.103 0.058 0.028 0.042 
 (0.192)** (0.173)** (0.048)* (0.051)* (0.269) (0.052)* (0.060) (0.097) (0.055) 
Death  -0.516 -0.223 0.005 -0.107 1.329 -0.040 0.002 0.074 -0.002 
 (0.642) (0.437) (0.077) (0.145) (0.467)** (0.131) (0.105) (0.162) (0.091) 
Observations 785 777 832 821 584 821 813 820 812 
Households 263 262 286 275 196 275 274 275 274 
Richest 50%          
Serious 
illness 
1.003 0.682 0.183 0.004 0.098 0.011 -0.020 0.003 -0.014 
 (0.202)** (0.167)** (0.046)** (0.063) (0.305) (0.071) (0.058) (0.128) (0.072) 
Death  0.077 -0.295 -0.153 -0.406 -0.684 -0.397 -0.016 1.030 0.522 
 (0.511) (0.421) (0.107) (0.181)* (0.734) (0.186)* (0.154) (0.298)** (0.206)* 
Observations 794 788 822 806 575 806 800 806 800 
Households 267 265 287 271 193 271 269 271 269 
Model FE Poisson FE Poisson Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and linear fixed effects models. Other covariates that 
are omitted from the table include indicator variables for other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and 
time-community interaction terms. The sample is divided into the poorest and wealthiest 50% based on per capita household (non-
medical) expenditures in wave 1 of the survey. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 7 Coping strategies for serious illness and death of household members 
 Deplete 
assets/ 
savings 
Borrowing Other Increase 
labour 
supply 
Debt to 
income 
ratio 
Serious illness 0.268 0.613 -0.084 -0.075 0.382 
 (0.104)* (0.129)** (0.115) (0.041) (0.164)* 
Death  0.230 0.258 -0.038 -0.175 0.016 
 (0.101)* (0.211) (0.147) (0.100) (0.303) 
Observations 477 477 477 1653 1427 
Households 345 345 345 555 484 
Poorest 50%      
Serious 
illness 
0.246 0.763 0.250 -0.107 0.624 
 (0.172) (0.156)** (0.209) (0.060) (0.250)* 
Death  0.375 0.543 -0.255 -0.076 -0.200 
 (0.182)* (0.240)* (0.335) (0.166) (0.425) 
Observations 239 239 239 818 710 
Households 171 171 171 274 241 
Richest 50%      
Serious 
illness 
0.107 0.453 -0.136 -0.086 0.154 
 (0.170) (0.297) (0.201) (0.062) (0.199) 
Death  -0.164 -0.235 0.140 -0.257 0.319 
 (0.182) (0.344) (0.221) (0.118)* (0.300) 
Observations 229 229 229 803 707 
Households 167 167 167 270 239 
Model Linear FE Linear FE Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed 
effects and fixed effects linear probability models. Other covariates that are 
omitted from the table include indicator variables for other shocks, household 
size, demographic composition of the household and time-community 
interaction terms. For depleting assets, borrowing and other coping strategies 
the sample is restricted to those households that reported to have experienced a 
shock in the respective survey round, yielding an unbalanced panel. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 8 Effects of lagged debt to income ratio on per capita household 
consumption 
 Food Non food Total 
Full sample 0.003 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.007)* (0.004)* 
Observations 1056 1078 1054 
Households 528 539 527 
Poorest 50% 0.013 -0.025 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.017) 
Observations 524 534 522 
Households 262 267 261 
Wealthiest 50% 0.001 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
Observations 520 524 520 
Households 260 262 260 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed 
effects. Other covariates that are omitted from the table include indicator 
variables for other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the 
household and time-community interaction terms. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Supplemental appendix  
 
 
Table A1 Test for attrition bias: probability of dropping out of the sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age household head -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Male household head -0.171 -0.174 -0.175 -0.221 -0.184 
 (0.224) (0.225) (0.226) (0.219) (0.237) 
Head completed 0.413 0.407 0.418 0.408 0.407 
Primary school (0.264) (0.263) (0.264) (0.267) (0.265) 
 0.252 0.263 0.245 0.168 0.244 
Secondary school (0.371) (0.377) (0.376) (0.367) (0.363) 
 0.451 0.439 0.416 0.349 0.468 
Higher secondary school (0.580) (0.613) (0.594) (0.567) (0.585) 
 -0.145* -0.153* -0.145* -0.121 -0.117 
Household size (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.070) 
  0.199    
Serious illness  (0.189)    
  0.298    
Death  (0.439)    
   0.001   
OOP health spending   (0.002)   
    0.0002  
Earned income    (0.0002)  
    -0.00003  
Unearned income    (0.0004)  
     0.001 
Food spending     (0.001) 
     -0.001 
Non-food spending     (0.001) 
 -0.766* -0.821* -0.770* -0.938* -0.677 
Constant (0.364) (0.378) (0.365) (0.395) (0.418) 
 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012 
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.055 0.050 0.054 0.054 
Observations 585 585 585 585 573 
Notes: Probit estimates. The explanatory variables are taken for the first survey 
wave only. The outcome variable is a dummy variable that takes value one if a 
household is not observed in all three survey waves. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table A2 Effects of serious illness and death of household members on per capita household consumption and income, household fixed 
effects regressions 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
Serious illness 16.618 0.051 -30.579 5.712 -27.259 4.170 6.402 10.454 
 (5.000)** (0.011)** (33.868) (14.612) (39.233) (3.672) (7.692) (8.917) 
Death  -6.080 -0.032 -215.511 6.298 -225.195 -4.313 69.085 65.326 
 (11.399) (0.026) (94.288)* (27.466) (108.404)* (9.515) (31.953)* (35.366) 
Observations 1608 1579 1659 1180 1659 1627 1658 1626 
Households 540 534 557 396 557 550 557 550 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from linear fixed effects models. Other covariates that are omitted from the table include indicator 
variables for other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
